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Abstract
Byzantine Agreement introduced in [Pease,
Shostak, Lamport, 80] is a widely used building
block of reliable distributed protocols. It sim-
ulates broadcast despite the presence of faulty
parties within the network, traditionally using
only private unicast links. Under such condi-
tions, Byzantine Agreement requires more than
2/3 of the parties to be compliant. [Fitzi, Mau-
rer, 00], constructed a Byzantine Agreement pro-
tocol for any compliant majority based on an ad-
ditional primitive allowing transmission to any
two parties simultaneously. They proposed a
problem of generalizing these results to wider
channels and fewer compliant parties. We prove
that 2f < kh condition is necessary and suffi-
cient for implementing broadcast with h compli-
ant and f faulty parties using k-cast channels.
1 Introduction
Broadcast primitives play a special role in multi-
player game theory as an integral component in
the fault-tolerant implementation of game proto-
cols. Given a compliant majority, broadcast and
private channels are sufficient to simulate any
multi-party computation [Rabin, Ben-Or, 89],
based on [Goldreich, Micali, Wigderson, 87], and
[Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Wigderson, 88]. With ad-
ditional primitives, such as private and oblivious
transfer channels, even a majority of faulty par-
ties can be tolerated [Beaver, Goldwasser, 89],
[Goldwasser, Levin. 90].
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Since reliable hardware solution is a strong as-
sumption, Byzantine Agreement protocols simu-
late broadcast on networks with faulty parties.
Given only private channels, Byzantine Agree-
ment is possible if and only if faulty parties are
in a < 1/3 minority ([Pease, Shostak, Lamport,
80]). For this reason, protocols tolerant to more
faults generally assume broadcast as a primitive.
Various hardware assumptions and communi-
cation goals were studied in the literature. For
instance, [Angluin 80], [Goldreich, Goldwasser,
Linial 91], [Franklin, Yung 95] and other pa-
pers studied problems of private communication
on an incomplete broadcast network. [Franklin,
Wright 98] showed that such a network with p
disjoint paths from sender to receiver could tol-
erate < p/2 faulty parties. [Wang, Desmedt 01]
showed that < p faulty parties could be handled
with probabilistic reliability.
The broadcast primitive is rather special in
that, unlike other common primitives, it involves
an unlimited number of parties. This suggests
exploring the power of a limited version of broad-
cast, with a constant number of recipients. As-
suming any compliant majority, [Fitzi, Maurer,
00] used a 3-party broadcast primitive to simu-
late full broadcast. They asked what fraction of
compliant parties would be required given wider
broadcast primitives. This is especially interest-
ing in view of results (e.g. [2, 11]) that con-
vert arbitrary protocols into equivalent ones with
added tolerance to any faulty majorities, assum-
ing the availability of broadcasts and two-party
primitives, such as oblivious transfer and private
channels. We show that broadcast with h com-
pliant and f faulty parties can be implemented
using k-cast channels if and only if 2f < kh.
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2 Definitions and Results
Definition 1 A k-cast channel is a primitive
for authenticated reliable communication to k
parties. To use it, one party, the sender, selects
k recipients, and a message m. Each recipient
gets m, as well as the identities of the sender and
the other recipients.
Definition 2 A protocol is an algorithm used in
rounds by several communicating parties. Each
party starts with an input appended with its and
other parties’ identities. At each round, parties
can k-cast messages to be used by the recipients
as inputs for the next round. Besides the al-
gorithm, the interaction is affected by the Ad-
versary who selects the initial inputs of all par-
ties and assigns, possibly with restrictions, their
loyalties, i.e., chooses a subset of faulty parties
and replaces their communications (inputs, mes-
sages, and outputs) by data of its choice.
Definition 3 Byzantine agreement is a broad-
cast simulating protocol. The party’s value is its
output for a recipient or input for the sender.
The protocol succeeds if the values of non-faulty
(compliant) parties are all identical.
Theorem 1 Byzantine agreement protocols for
h compliant and f faulty parties using k-cast
channels exist if and only if 2f < kh.
2.1 Broadcast and Consensus
In a traditional consensus model, each party
starts with an input value. After running a con-
sensus protocol, all compliant parties output val-
ues consistent with each other and with an input
of at least one compliant party. With a com-
pliant majority, consensus is easily shown to be
equivalent to broadcast. To achieve consensus,
each party broadcasts its value to the others who
then output the majority value. To broadcast,
the sender sends its input to all parties, who then
run a consensus protocol on the values received.
This equivalence fails when the majority is
faulty. The Adversary gives inputs 0 and 1 to an
equal number of parties. They all run the pro-
tocol faithfully. The Adversary defeats the con-
sensus by keeping compliant some parties with
different outputs or declaring faulty all parties
whose inputs match the uniform output.
One can generalize the consensus model, by
assuming each party to have not just one input
or output value but rather a distribution, i.e.,
a value for each k-node set he belongs to. All
compliant members of the set get the same input
value for it. All output values of compliant par-
ties must agree with each other and with at least
one input of a compliant party. This model can
simulate broadcast after the sender distributes
his input, i.e., k-casts it to all k-node sets.
3 Proof of the Lower Bound
3.1 Big Rings and Chains
The Adversary’s ability to defy the agreement
will depend on having enough parties to build
a big ring. A (k, h)-ring is a set of k+2 or
more clusters of parties where the clusters are
arranged in a cycle, with at least h parties in
any two adjacent clusters. These bounds assure
that no message can be sent to all clusters, and
all compliant parties can fit in any two adjacent
clusters. Adding up parties in all pairs of consec-
utive clusters, we get (k+2)h or more, counting
each party twice. So, to build the ring, the Ad-
versary needs f+h ≥ (k+2)h/2 parties, which
means 2f ≥ kh. A (k, h)-ring could be opened
into a (k, h)-chain by duplicating all nodes in the
sender’s cluster S, creating two clusters, S0 and
S1.
3.2 The Adversary Strategy
The Adversary defeats any protocol P if 2f ≥
kh. It arranges the parties into a (k, h)-chain,
duplicating the sender’s cluster S as in sec-
tion 3.1. One copy of S will end up being sim-
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ulated by the adversary. Both copies play the
same part in protocol P, receiving duplicate mes-
sages from other clusters. The two copies of the
sender get opposite inputs. The messages from
S are generated by both copies, but one copy is
intercepted by the Adversary as follows.
Each transmission from S misses all parties in
at least one other cluster. Discounting the left-
most such cluster splits the chain into two sub-
chains: C0 and C1. The Adversary will keep
compliant two adjacent clusters, so either C0 or
C1 will have no compliant parties. Thus the Ad-
versary can and does intercept the messages from
Sm to C1−m.
With these restrictions on the Adversary, no
messages or outputs depend on its choice of com-
pliant parties. Since the values of the S0 and S1
copies of the sender differ, there must be parties
in adjacent clusters that disagree on their value.
The Adversary defeats the protocol by choosing
the conflicting clusters as compliant, corrupting
all others.
4 Proof of the Upper Bound
We describe a Byzantine protocol Ph for h com-
pliant and f = ⌈kh/2⌉ − 1 faulty parties. It
can also run with fewer, n < h+ f , parties,
and is still guaranteed to succeed, provided all
d = h+f−n missing parties are counted as faulty
if the sender s (who will represent the missing
parties) is faulty. P starts with s distributing
its input, and uses the following concept of trust
graphs.
4.1 Trust Graphs
A trust graph is formed by each party and links
pairs of parties that report consistently inputs
received from s by both. “Sender clusters” Sm
are added to the graph, each Sm being a clique of
1+d nodes connected to all recipients who report
uniform inputs m.
A pruning is then conducted as follows. Be-
cause the h compliant parties must form a clique,
edges not in cliques can be removed. Since
cliques are hard to detect, we remove instead
(until none left) edges (a, b) that do not belong to
any bi-star i.e., an h-node star with two centers
a, b (adjacent to all its nodes).
We use trust graphs to choose agreement val-
ues. All compliant parties must be adjacent in
the graph. If, in their respective graphs, com-
pliant recipients have paths to a unique sender
cluster, they may immediately output its value.
Consider a path connecting nodes in Sm with
different m, say, S0 and S1. It must have more
than k recipients. Otherwise there would be one
k-cast received by them all; since parties con-
nected to Sm claim this k-cast was m, there must
be some disagreement along this path.
One can break S0, S1 and the recipients into
clusters according to the distance from S0, drop-
ping nodes more distant than S1. They form a
(k, h)-chain, since every two consecutive clusters
include an h-node bi-star. So, by section 3.1, a
trust graph with a path between S0 and S1 im-
plies 2f ≥ kh.
4.2 The Protocol
Each party i distributes all messages Mi it re-
ceived from s. Then all parties except s run Ph
recursively to agree on Mi and form trust graphs
based on the agreed Mi’s. Let n be the minimal
number of parties for which the guarantee for
Ph can fail. Then the agreement on Mi succeeds
unless s is compliant and i faulty.
Thus, the compliant parties always form a
clique, and if s is not among them, the graphs
are identical. Then each party with a path to
Sm outputs m, or 0, if no such paths exist. The
agreement can fail only if a path connects both
Sm. As per Section 4.1, this contradicts 2f < kh.
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